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Resource Resilience: How to Break the
Commodities Cycle

A worker cuts a diamond, reflecting Botswana’s attempt to control stages of diamond production
beyond mining, Gaborone, Botswana, March 18, 2008 (AP photo by Themba Hadebe).

By Lisa Sachs, Nicolas Maennling, May 26, 2015, Feature
The past year has seen dramatic declines in the prices of global commodities. Between June 2014 and the
beginning of this year, crude oil prices fell by 50 percent to around $50 a barrel. Similarly, mineral prices
have seen a drastic fall since the peak of the “commodity supercycle” in early 2011. Between then and
April of this year, iron ore prices fell by 70 percent, coal prices by 54 percent and copper prices by 40
percent.

Many countries dependent on revenues from these commodities have been hit hard. Venezuela is unable
to import food and medicine to satisfy the basic needs of its population due to the lack of petrodollars.
Russia’s economy is expected to contract by 3.8 percent this year, as a result of the oil price fall combined
with Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis, which have sent the ruble tumbling. Nigeria is slashing its
budget, which would require a petroleum price of $122 per barrel to balance out.

Mineral-exporting countries, especially those in developing markets in Africa, have also felt the brunt.

Sierra Leone’s two largest iron ore mines had to close in late 2014 after running out of cash and not being
able to repay creditors. With iron ore accounting for a quarter of Sierra Leone’s economy and half of its
exports, the International Monetary Fund forecasts the economy to contract by 13 percent this year.
Mozambique, deemed the most promising source of untapped coking coal, only exported 7 million tons of
coal last year—17 percent of what was projected four years ago—with companies facing an uphill battle
just to cover their operating costs. Rio Tinto sold its coal concessions in Mozambique for $50 million late
last year after having acquired them for $4.2 billion three years earlier. Zambia saw its fiscal deficit
widen due to falling copper prices last year, and the national currency, the kwacha, was the worstperforming currency in Africa.

While the recent fall in prices has been significant across the board, large price fluctuations are nothing
new in the commodities sector. The World Bank energy index, for example, fell by 48 percent in 1986 as
a result of slowed economic activity in industrialized countries. Similar drops occurred in the metals and
minerals index between 1988 and 1993 and the agriculture index between 1974 and 1982.

Over time, commodity price fluctuations are inevitable. This raises the question of what countries
dependent on commodity exports can learn from past mistakes, and what measures they can take to build
resilience against commodity cycles. This article describes the strategies various countries have
employed—including budgeting mechanisms that account for price fluctuations, natural resource funds
and economic diversification strategies—and considers the challenges and opportunities of each
approach.

Managing Revenue Volatility

A key to breaking the commodity cycle trap is more strategic management of resource revenues. Without
a mechanism in place to regulate when and how resource revenues are spent, revenue volatility leads to
expenditure volatility. If government budgets are not insulated from revenue volatility, governments will
either have to make major budget cuts when revenues decrease from previous years or to borrow against
uncertain and unpredictable future revenues.

Annual budget adjustments make development-planning efforts impossible. Infrastructure projects, for
example, are multiyear investments and cannot be properly implemented with stop-and-go spending.
Massive public sector layoffs or decreasing wages for public servants such as teachers and nurses can

create political crises. Borrowing is one way around this, but borrowing can lead, and has led, to debt
crises when the revenues from natural resources consistently fall below forecasts.

Large expenditure increases when new projects come online or prices spike can also be risky if the
economy cannot absorb additional government spending. This may result in high inflation rates and real
exchange rate appreciation, which in turn can reduce the competitiveness of the non-resource-based
tradable sector, thereby increasing a country’s dependence on commodity exports.
The Economist dubbed this phenomenon “Dutch Disease” in 1977, after the Netherlands experienced
deindustrialization following large gas discoveries in 1959. Dutch Disease can be partly addressed by
directing government spending to areas that increase productivity, such as investments in infrastructure,
health and education.

However, in countries where short-term budget flows exceed yearly budgetary needs or capacity, or in
countries that already provide ample public goods, governments need a mechanism to save commodity
revenues until a point where the money can be spent efficiently. The necessity for a mechanism to
manage resource revenues increases as resource revenues grow as a percentage of total revenues. For
many countries, natural resource funds may appear to be an attractive solution, but they, too, come with a
number of challenges.

Natural Resource Funds

Several resource-rich countries have set up natural resource funds, or sovereign wealth funds, to stabilize
government expenditures; to save for future generations; to sterilize capital inflows to avoid overheating
the economy; to earmark revenues from the extractive sector for particular purposes; or to ring-fence the
revenues to try to avoid mismanagement. Natural resource funds have become increasingly popular
around the world; 30 of the 45 funds that are currently active were established in the past 15 years.

However, the objectives of the funds are often unclear, and even when they are clear, the rules are not
always followed. While Chile, Norway and Saudi Arabia were successful at using stabilization funds to
smooth budget expenditure growth between 2001 and 2013, expenditures in Kazakhstan, Venezuela and
Trinidad and Tobago increased and decreased with oil revenues during the same period despite similar
stabilization funds.

Kazakhstan, for example, established its National Fund in 2000 to stabilize its budget and save for future
generations. While the deposit rules outline that oil and gas revenues should be channeled into the fund,
the list of companies whose taxes are deposited can be changed arbitrarily from year to year. Furthermore,
the withdrawal rules have been changed three times in seven years, and the lack of independence between
Parliament and the management council of the fund impedes effective oversight, resulting in large
expenditure swings.

Norway, on the other hand, has been successful in adhering to the withdrawal rules it set in 2001.
These call for a limit on the non-oil structural deficit—the permanent deficit that excludes oil revenues—
of 4 percent of the assets of the fund. Since 4 percent is the expected long-term real return on the fund,
this rule effectively only allows for the returns on the fund to be spent. Norway’s fund is fully integrated
in the government’s annual budget, with supervisory bodies at all levels of the fund management, and
Parliament must approve any withdrawal from the fund.
Canada’s energy-rich province of Alberta illustrates that poorly designed savings funds will not
necessarily lead to the stated goal. In 1976, the province set up the Alberta Heritage Savings Fund to set
aside revenues for future generations. But Alberta only made two relatively small deposits between 1987
and 2013, both at times when production and oil prices were at all-time highs. While such spending of
resource revenues through the national budget might be justified if targeted at investments that support
long-term objectives, in Alberta the majority of the province’s oil revenue spending led to inflation and
unsustainable consumption. The fund did not have clear deposit rules, so it could not constrain political
pressure to spend rather than save the revenues. The recent oil price drop and the resulting economic
slump help explain why Alberta rejected its conservative governing party earlier this month for the first
time in more than four decades, with the province’s new premier-elect pledging to end the boom and bust
cycle.
East Timor’s Petroleum Fund, on the other hand, has been relatively successful at saving oil revenues
since setting up institutions to manage them more efficiently. After achieving independence from
Indonesia in 2002, and with its infrastructure, education and health sectors in shambles, East Timor
established a fund in 2005 to stabilize spending and save oil revenues, following the model of Norway.
The deposit rules require all oil and gas revenues to be deposited in the fund, and withdrawals are limited
to the interest earned on the petroleum wealth of the country, with excess withdrawals needing approval

from Parliament. The fund was invested in bonds and equities abroad to prevent East Timor’s domestic
economy from overheating.

In 2011, East Timor presented a 20-year development plan, which foresaw spending a portion of the oil
revenues up front in infrastructure and human capital projects. These investments are expected to provide
a higher return for the Timorese population than the foreign treasury bonds in which the fund was
invested. Moreover, investments in infrastructure and human capital are needed to address critical
development needs, including access to health care, education and electricity, as well as to create a
foundation for more private sector investment. The challenge for East Timor going forward will be to
design robust public investment plans for the additional front-loaded expenditures, and then to return to a
sustainable spending path thereafter.

These examples show that natural resource funds are only as effective as the rules that govern them and
the adherence of the organizations that manage them. To improve the governance of these funds, the
following criteria should be met:

First of all, funds should set up clear objectives, such as saving for future generations or stabilizing
budget expenditures. Without such objectives, it is hard to define the rules that govern the fund.

Second, they should establish fiscal rules that are aligned with the fund objectives. These rules, including
both deposit and withdrawal rules, should be legally binding for successive governments, so as to act as a
commitment mechanism.

Third, funds should establish investment rules to outline where the deposited money can be invested,
depending on the risk profile the country is willing to take and whether the fund can only invest abroad or
also domestically.

Fourth, funds should clarify institutional structures and rules of conduct. Roles and responsibilities need
to be clearly defined in the law, regulations and policy documents. Strong ethical requirements and
conflict of interest standards should be enforced.

Fifth, funds must require regular and extensive disclosure audits, as transparency is a prerequisite for
accountability and compliance.

And finally, funds must establish strong independent oversight bodies. Internal control mechanisms are
often not enough to ensure good governance and compliance. Therefore, external independent bodies
should audit policymakers and fund managers to enforce the rules.

While meeting these requirements can ensure that resource revenues are managed wisely and are used to
support macroeconomic stability, the challenge for resource-rich countries is to become less reliant on a
few exported commodities and to diversify into other sectors.

Diversifying the Economy

A more fundamental way for countries to buffer themselves against the commodities cycle is to break
their dependence on natural resources by diversifying their economies. There is strong empirical evidence
that economic diversification leads to higher long-term economic growth. Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar
Hidalgo have shown that a country’s economic growth is determined not only by the amount it exports,
but also by the composition of exports. The more complex and technologically advanced the exports of a
country, the higher the long-term economic growth is likely to be.

In addition, countries that are diversified are less susceptible to the price and production shocks of a small
number of commodities. They will also be better prepared for the eventual depletion of nonrenewable
resources. And they will offer better employment opportunities for their people, since the extractive sector
is generally not labor-intensive.

Drawing lessons from how the United States and Canada industrialized their economies, Albert
Hirschman suggested that policymakers can leverage three types of extractive sector linkages to promote
diversification. First, there are fiscal linkages: the use of revenues from the resource sector to promote
other sectors. Second, there are production linkages, including backward linkages through investments in
services and goods used to produce the commodities, and forward linkages through investments in
services and goods used to process the commodities. Finally, there are consumption linkages: the demand
resulting from the incomes earned in the commodities sector. This section will explore all three types of
linkage in more detail.

Fiscal linkages. Fiscal linkages consist of channeling the revenues from commodity exports toward other

sectors. Governments may use revenues either to improve the business environment more generally or to
target specific sectors.

For example, Malaysia has made use of a combination of these policies to support its long-term
development plans since its independence from Britain in 1957. Heavily reliant on rubber and tin exports
in the early years of independence, Malaysia used the revenue earnings from these sectors to increase
agricultural productivity and reduce poverty. Tin and rubber revenues were used to subsidize and
incentivize the development of the palm oil sector and to set up the Palm Oil Research Institute of
Malaysia (PORIM) to increase yield rates.

In the early 1970s, Malaysia embarked on an aggressive export-oriented industrialization strategy. Cheap
labor, industrial parks and fiscal incentives were used to attract manufacturing companies. In the 1980s,
revenues from the oil and gas sector were used to support and provide special treatment to the electronics,
transportation and automobile sectors. This was accompanied by policy measures to incentivize skilled
immigration, create polytechnic institutions and establish academic institutions with strong ties to
Australia and Canada to promote skills and technological transfers. And in 2006, Malaysia embarked on
its third industrial development plan, which is set to run through 2020 and targets high-tech industries.
These policies have contributed to Malaysia’s growth, earning it a spot as one of 13 countries with
average growth of more than 7 percent per year for 25 years or more, as identified by the Commission on
Growth and Development.

Chile is another country that has been successful at using its resource base to promote other economic
sectors. Rather than aiming to move into more complex industrial sectors, Chile has targeted public
investments to create thriving pine tree, salmon and wine industries, none of which were traditionally
produced in the country. These sectors were supported through incentives such as export subsidies, credit
lines, the sharing of startup costs and the promotion of technologies to adapt these agriculture and
aquaculture projects to Chile’s environment. In 2006, the government established the Innovation for
Competitiveness Fund, which channels copper revenues to finance Chile’s 15-year Innovation and
Competitiveness strategy. As part of this strategy, the government has identified seven clusters with high
export potential, including tourism and agriculture, which could be supported and promoted for further
diversification efforts. While Chile has experienced solid growth over the past 20 years and was one of
Latin America’s fastest-growing economies in the last decade, the country still faces the challenges of
ensuring equitable and inclusive growth and reducing inequality.

Production linkages. Production linkages, both backward and forward, are the most direct way to
leverage the resource sector for broader economic development.

The London-based multinational mining company Anglo American has estimated that in 2013, about half
of its expenditures went to suppliers—five times more than the amount paid to governments. In response
to figures like these, governments have pushed for the local procurement of these goods and services
through incentives and “local content” regulations.

Norway has been relatively successful at creating backward linkages. The country did not have the
expertise to supply offshore oil rigs when oil was first discovered in 1969. In 1972, Norway passed the
Royal Decree, requiring that all operations were obliged to source from Norwegian companies unless they
were not competitive in terms of quality, service and price. The 1985 Petroleum Act further stipulated
local content provisions to be used to allocate licenses in the North Sea.
As a result, Norway’s licensing bidding rounds provided preferential treatment to Norwegian companies
in all bidding rounds between 1974 and 1994. The licenses also included provisions requiring the transfer
of skills and technologies to Norway’s infant domestic petroleum industry. In 1994, Norway joined the
European Economic Area, a single market with the European Union, and as a condition of membership
was not allowed to continue with its preferential treatment policies. However, by that point, the backward
linkages were already established, and today Norway is exporting its offshore service expertise to the rest
of the world.

Fewer countries have successfully implemented forward linkages, associated with the processing of raw
commodities. One exception is Botswana. Botswana is often hailed as one of the best performers in subSaharan Africa, with high economic growth rates and prudent macroeconomic management. However,
the country has been highly dependent on exports of raw diamonds since its independence from Britain in
1966, and various diversification attempts have failed. This can largely be traced back to the country’s
having few comparative advantages. It is landlocked, with two-thirds of its territory covered by desert,
and it has a small internal market.

Since the 1980s, Botswana has attempted to develop a diamond cutting and polishing industry. Originally,
De Beers, the major diamond producer in the country, argued that the cutting and polishing industry

would not be economically viable, and therefore did not support the government’s efforts. Only in 2005,
when De Beers had to renew its 25-year mining license, was the government able to pressure the
company to commit to treat the diamonds in-country. Sixteen cutting and polishing companies were
licensed to operate in Botswana, with allocation of raw diamonds dependent on the hiring and training of
Botswanan nationals.

In 2013, De Beers moved its global sorting, aggregation and sales operations from London to Gaborone,
making Botswana the new trading hub for rough diamonds from its own mines and those in neighboring
Namibia and South Africa, and even from as far away as Canada. In the long run, Botswana aims to
attract jewelers and retailers to build up sufficient expertise to sustain this activity even when rough
diamond production in the country falls.

Indonesia has taken more drastic measures to process its minerals in country. The government imposed
export taxes on unprocessed minerals in 2009 and an export ban in 2014. Industry strongly pushed back
on the ban, particularly because the country lacked the requisite beneficiation capacity, including
infrastructure and skilled labor, and both production and exports fell as a result. However, despite the
global commodity price fall, the policy has had some success, with 11 new nickel smelters scheduled to
be built in Indonesia in the coming years. Newmont Mining Corporation, one of the fiercest critics of the
government policy, is also moving ahead with its expansion plans for an Indonesian copper smelter.
While Indonesia’s bold policy decision set back the mining sector and the economy in the short run, it
remains to be seen whether it will benefit the country’s diversification strategy in the long run.

Consumption linkages. Consumption linkages arise with the demand for goods and services from
incomes earned in the commodities sector. In the 1960s and 1970s, import-substitution policies in Chile
and Malaysia, for example, targeted consumption linkages by increasing the price of imported goods
through tariffs and nontrade barriers. However, these policies have largely been abolished since the early
1980s, as it has become widely acknowledged that the long-term benefits of an open economy outweigh
those of protecting domestic producers from international competition. With falling logistics and
transportation costs and the abolition of import-substitution policies, consumption demand has
increasingly leaked abroad via imports.

However, there is space for governments to target sectors that benefit from natural protective barriers.

These may include service sectors that require a local presence, agricultural produce that is highly
perishable and construction materials that have high transport-to-value ratios, such as cement.
There is no one set path for resource-rich countries to diversify into other sectors. Production and
consumption linkages can be more straightforward because of their connection to an “anchor project,” but
countries that have been relatively successful at diversification have also done so through fiscal linkages.
It is important that targeting policies are not made on an ad hoc basis, but are based on an assessment of
comparative advantage that accounts for policy goals, future prospects and regional market growth. It is
important that such policies are flexible and are reviewed on a regular basis to reflect economic
developments and to avoid supporting failing sectors.

Lessons Learned

For resource-rich countries to break the commodities cycle, prudent macroeconomic management is a
prerequisite. This entails controlling revenue volatility from export earnings and keeping a close eye on
inflation and exchange rates to prevent the economy from overheating and other tradable sectors from
suffering. Well-governed natural resource funds can help by smoothing government expenditure,
sterilizing the economy from resource revenues and helping to earmark resource revenues for investment
projects that increase productivity.

Diversifying out of the commodities sector is a difficult undertaking, and not many countries have
succeeded. Most have not been able to secure macroeconomic stability in the first place, in part because
the temptation to spend available revenues is strong.
There is no single diversification path, as the optimal strategies largely depend on a country’s
comparative advantages and bargaining position. Botswana, for example, was only able to drive a hard
bargain to move downstream because it is the second-biggest diamond producer in the world, and De
Beers could not afford to lose access to such an important source.

What is certain is that breaking the commodity cycle requires fiscal discipline, a medium- to long-term
development plan, integrated governmental policies to capture available linkages and targeted sectoral
support. What is also certain is that commodities booms inevitably turn to busts, as the recent price
downturn has once again illustrated. When they do, the importance of breaking resource dependency
becomes clear.
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